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Africa  faces  increasingly  critical  resource  constraints  in  its  effort  to  extend  water
services of acceptable  quality to  the vast majority of its people.  (e.g.,  see  Pouliquen, 2000;
Sandelin,  1994;  Snell,  1998;  World Bank,  1999). The inefficiency  of water utilities  is often
identified  as one of the major factors.  in explaining the slow progress  and the many setbacks
in improving access to water and water distribution (e.g.,  see Schuebeler,  1995;  World Bank,
1999).  Yet,  there  is a surprising dearth  of literature  attempting to  measure the  efficiency  of
operators  in  a way that would allow economic  regulators to  introduce explicitly performance
incentives  in the regulation  of the operators  in African countries.  Perhaps  because the partial
productivity  indicators,  such  as water  losses  or number of employees  per connection,  have
generally  been so  poor that  radical  operational  reforms  were  easy to propose,  much  of the
attention  of policymakers,  donors  and researchers  seems  to have  focused on the  institutional
and financing aspects  of water sector reforms.  The need to mobilize additional resources  for
water through fees and other modalities of financing and the potential  for an increased public-
private  partnership  in  the  sector  were  particularly  emphasized  (e.g.,  World  Bank  1999;
UNDP-World  Bank Water  and  Sanitation  Program -West  and Central Africa  Office,  1998
and Snell, 1998)
The main purpose of this paper is to show that it is worth assessing more carefully the
potential efficiency improvements that should result from the much emphasized  reforms. This
would  allow  quantitative  assessments  of the  potential  improvements  in the  overall  use  of
inputs  and  a  more  analytical  discussion  of the  optimal  scale  of operation.  Both  potential
sources  of efficiency  gains could  be set as  targets  for the restructured sectors  and  go  a long
way  in  cutting  the  financing  requirements.  This,  in  turn,  implies  that  the  need  for tariff
increases  may  not be  as  high  as  sometimes  argued  for  some  of the  markets.  Moreover,  it
implies  that there is scope  for regulatory supervision  which  ensures  that the efficiency  gains
are not simply turned into pure rent for the new operators but are eventually shared  with the
consumers.
We assess the potential  for efficiency improvements and the importance of the scale of
operation  by  estimating  a  production  frontier  for  the  region.  For  lack  of better  data,  we
estimate this production function  from an unbalanced panel of data for a sample of 21  African
water  utilities  covering  the  1995-1997  period.  To  contribute  to the  design  of reforms,  the
2paper also  quantifies  the joint effect of various  institutional  sources of inefficiencies  and  in
particular  assesses  the costs  of the  interactions  between  inefficiency  and  major institutional
problems, in particular governance problems hurting many African countries.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a brief overview on the African
water  utility  sector.  Section  3  discusses  the  analytical  and  conceptual  framework  and
introduces the panel data method for unbalanced  data  analysis.  Sector 4 explains the data and
empirical  model  selection  procedure.  Section  5  presents  the  empirical  results;  Section  6
discusses the results.  Section 7 concludes with some policy implications.
2. SOME STYLIZED FACTS  ON AFRICA'S WATER SECTOR
Currently, only 64% of Africa's urban population has access  to safe water supply and
55% have access to sanitation.  Of these,  14% have house connections  and fewer have  access
to sanitation.  The correlation  of water coverage  levels  with income levels  is clear  as seen in
Figure  1 but also more  complex than many would  expect  since  income  levels explain  only
40%  of  the  differences  in  water  coverage.  This  in  turn  suggests  that  there  is  more  to
improving access than waiting for growth to accelerate.







o°  40  X  K  _--
0  20  -
0  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000  3500  4000
GNP/capita  (1999)
3One of the most obvious  additional  explanation  for the differences  in water coverage
is  the  institutional  arrangements  adopted  for  the  sector.  Table  1 gives  a  snapshot  of the
organization  of the  sector  in Africa  during the period  covered by this  analysis.  The  data is
collected  from  a survey of twenty  one Africa water utilities.  From  a statistical  viewpoint,  it
yields  an  unbalanced panel  of twenty  one utilities  observed  over the  period  1995-1997  is
representative  of the  total  of one  hundred  and  fifty water utilities  in the  region.  The  salient
feature are that: (i) most utilities are in the public domain (85,71%);  (ii) most of them are also
water  suppliers  (77%);  (iii)  private  sector  participation  in  these  utilities  was  very  limited
during the period analyzed (9.52%).
Table 1: African Water Utility Firms 1995-1997
Country  Water  Type of  Area of  Score of Activity  Private Sector
Utility  Utility  Jurisdiction  Participation
Benin  SBEE  Public  Country  Water Supply  No
Burkina  ONEA  Public  Country  Water Supply and Sewerage  No
Faso
CBte  SODECI  Private  Country  Water Distribution  Leasing
d'Ivoire
Ethiopia  AA WSA  Public  Municipal  Water Supply  No
Ghana  GWSC  Public  Country  Water Supply  No
CWA  Public  Country  Water Supply  No
Mauritius
Morocco  ONEP  Public  Country  Water Supply  No
Morocco  RED  Public  Country  Water Supply  No
Namibia  WM  Public  Province  Water Supply and Sewerage  No
Niger  SNE  Public  Country  Water Supply  No
Nigeria  KdSWB  Public  Region  Water Supply  No
Nigeria  KtSWB  Public  Region  Water Supply  No
Nigeria  BoSWB  Public  Region  Water Supply  No
Nigeria  EdSWB  Public  Region  Water Supply  No
Senegal  SDE  Private  Country  Water Supply  Affermage
South  UMGENI  Both  Public  Region  Water Supply and Sewerage  No
Africa  and Private
South  RAND-W  Public  Region  Water Production  No
Africa
Togo  RNET  Public  Country  Water Supply  No
Tunisia  SONEDE  EPIC2  Country  Water Supply  No
Uganda  NWSC  Public  Country  Water  Supply  No
Zambia  LMSC  Public  Province  Water Supply  No
Notes:  a Public enterprise  but with a privatized management.
What the table does not tell (partially because there is little specific data on this topic),
is  that  the  organization  of the  sector  is  shifting  towards  a  community-driven  development
4approach,  ignoring  the  basic  traditional  assumption  in  the  sector  that  economies  of scale
justify large utilities in order to reduce costs by making the most of economies of scale. This
preference  for  smaller  scale  operations  is  clear in  rural  and  peri-urban  areas  but  it is  also
increasingly  important  in  urban  areas  which  continue  to  be  under  the  control  of more
traditional  water utilities. Indeed,  even for these utilities, the need for constant interfaces with
the users  to  ensure  that  supply meets  the  demand  and  willingness  to pay  leads  to  actual
payments is now recognized as a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for success.
The  fact that utilities follow  the  demand  orientation  path adopted  for rural  and peri-
urban  approaches  also reflect  a desire  to  increase  accountability  with the hope  that  it will
indeed  improve  and  accelerate  access  to  water  services.  This  would  imply  that  lower
corruption or governance problems  levels are  expected to be associated  with better coverage
levels. Figure  2 provides  a naive confirmation of this intuition (with the notable exception of
Ethiopia where geological conditions offset the benefit of a good governance  score).
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This  quick,  and  somewhat  naive,  overview  of the  sector  shows  that  the  frustrated
demand  is  likely  to  be  great  as  revealed  by  the  low  coverage  rates  but  also  that  the
5organizational  structure of the sector and governance quality are likely to be important factors
to  account  for.  A  more  subtle  third  message  is  that  it  may  be  useful  to  have  a  more
quantitative  view of the  supply side of this market to ensure that cost are minimized.  Finally,
it is also  important to  check the extent to which  the institutional  arrangements  contribute  to
the  reduction  of these  costs and hence  to the better use of the resources  available  to expand
and accelerate  the investments needed to meet the frustrated  demand.
3. ANALYTICAL  AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In  spite  of the  diversity  of experiences  with  water  sector  provision  in  Africa,  the
overview  presented  in  section  2  reveals  the  need  to  tackle  four  main  policy  issues.  The
authorities  responsible  for the water sector  need to be able  to:  (i)  compare  as rigorously  as
possible the firms they are responsible for with similar firms in the region as, implying that an
efficiency  ranking  of firms  would  be useful,  (ii)  assess  fully  potential  efficiency  gains  for
individual firms from better joint uses of all inputs, (iii) assess the efficiency costs of ignoring
potential  scale  economies  by  focusing  on  smaller  scale  operations  and  (iv)  assess  the
efficiency effects of governance problems.
While partial productivity  indicators generally prove to be useful  instruments  to get a
quick  overview  of the performance  of any  enterprise,  they  can  often  be  misleading  when
comparing various firms. Not all partial indicators necessarily yield the same  ranking and this
is why we need to have a joint assessment  of the effects of the key inputs if robust ranking are
expected.  Second,  when  setting  targets  for operational  improvements  and  in particular  cost
reductions,  once more, we need to account for the joint effect of all inputs rather than for the
effects  specific  inputs and to come up with a  single sector or firm  specific  figure which will
serve  as  a  target.  Third,  in  view  of the  institutional  changes  which  seem  to  spreading
throughout the region and resulted in the decision to go for smaller scale operations,  we also
need to have  an  instrument  that allows  a fair assessment of the opportunity  cost in terms  in
terms  of economies  of scale  to  be  tapped.  Finally,  the  limits  of what  can be  done  when
corruption  interferes  with the process of reform  must be recognized  and  assessed  as well if
targets are to reachable.  The focus on technical  efficiency as defined by economists  allows us
to address all of these issues.
63.1 Technical Efficiency:  Concept and Measurement
The measurement of efficiency in the water sector is complicated  by the nature of the
production  process  (e.g,  see  Sengupta  and  Monsour,  1986;  Eglal  et  al.,  1996;  Hunt  and
Lynk,  1995;  Bishop and Thompsom,  1992; and Ashton, 2000).  Complications  arise  from the
fact that water production is  a function of many variables,  many of which are  exogenous to
the  water  sector  - for  example  household  income,  chemical  products  prices,  and  intra-
household decisions etc.
Farell  (1957),  drawing  upon  the  work  of  Debreu  (1951)  and  Koopmans  (1951),
introduced  a  measure  of productive  efficiency  that  avoids  the  problems  associated  with
traditional  average  productivity  measures  (ratios).  He proposed  that  efficiency  relative  to  a
best-performance  frontier determined by a representative peer group. In the Farell framework,
a firm's  efficiency  is measured  relative  to the  efficiency  of all  other  firms  in the industry,
subject  to  the restriction  that  all  firms  are  on  or  below  the  frontier.  A firm  is  regarded  as
technically efficient if it is operating on the best-practice  production  frontier  in the industry.
The  degree of technical  efficiency  is given by the ratio of the minimal  input required to the
actual input use, given the input mix used by the firm.  It tells the utility manager  the amount
by which all inputs could be reduced without a reduction  in output.  Technical efficiency takes
the values between zero  and one (0 < TE,  < 1). Technically inefficient production units have
a TE1 value less than one, while the efficient ones have a TEi value of 1.
As  seen  in  the  foregoing  discussion,  empirical  estimates  of  efficiency  measures
involve  two  steps:  (i)  estimation  of the frontier  and (ii)  calculation  of the  individual  water
utility deviations  from  the  frontier.  Currently,  there  are  two  approaches  used in estimating
frontiers  (see for instance,  Coelli et alt 1998  or Coelli et alt. 2001).  These are the parametric
approach,  which  relies  on  econometric  methods,  and  the  non-parametric approach,  which
involves  linear programming techniques.  The  stochastic  and  parametric frontiers  are
considered in the present study, and computed through panel estimation techniques.
3.2  Stochastic Frontier Models  and Unbalanced Panel Data
Our empirical  work focuses  on the estimation  of a  stochastic  frontiers  for a panel of
data.  This implies, among other problems, having to make assumptions  about the distribution
7of the technical efficiency,  also accepting that the distribution of the technical  efficiency of a
firm and the regressors  (inputs) are independent.  This assumption is very restrictive because it
is reasonable  to think that if the firm knows its inefficiency level, the selected quantities of the
inputs can  be affected.  The statistical  analysis  of econometric models  with panel data allows
applications  to  the estimations  of frontier models  to be developed  and,  with them,  one can
partially solve the estimation problems2.
Schmidt  and Sickles  (1984)  established  the  basic  idea  and  Comwell  extended  it  in
1990 (Comwell  et al.,  1990).  The model  suggested  was  as follows:  if we have  a data panel
composed by T temporal  observations  for N productive  units, we  can represent the technology
with the following production function (we assume a linear technology for simplicity):
K
yj, =aoc+ I  xki,C,k+  ej,, i  =  ,..........  N;  t  =1  .. ,T;  k  =1  .. ,K  (1)
k=1
where
-'i  =  )  - u,  (2)
where y denotes the output,  Xk represents  the kth inputs  and  Pk stands for the output  elasticity
with respect to the  kth input.  Finally,  s is a  composed  error terms;  jit is a disturbance  term
with the usual characteristics  [iid, N(0,&2,)]  that captures the random  factors  that can  explain
the  divergence  between  the  observed  and  the  potential  output  enumerated  above  and  ui
captures  the  time-invaring  latent  individual  effects.  Then,  the ui's  are  positive  and iid with
mean  t and variance o2u and they are independent of uit. That is,  [ui % D(gL,  c&2u)].
Therefore  the  parameter  t  represents  the  latent  average  inefficiency  level  of
technology.  We  can  also estimate  (or not) a particular distribution  for ui, and we can assume
(or not) that inefficiency  is correlated with the inputs.  The technical  efficiency measurement
of an ith firm will be obtained  from
ET = e-u  (3)
This model  is a simple generalization  of the stochastic  frontier models corresponding
to the usual literature  of panel data models  with individual  effects.  The only difference  with
the  standard  panel data  models is that in Equation  1 the  individual  effects  (u;)  are one-sided.
2  Simar's article (1992) constitutes a good survey of the frontier methodology  with panel data, with an
application of the different  methods and estimators proposed.
8Following Schmidt and Sickles  (1984) the model can be managed in the following way. Since
we know that E(uj) = 11 > 0, we can define:
a  =a- p  (4)
u,  = u,-P  (5)
and consequently  u*j is independent  and identically distributed with E(u*i) = 0. Therefore,  the
model (1) can be expressed as follows:
K
yi,=a +Zx,J,Jk+vi_-ui  (6)
k=1
Now, the two errors have mean zero and therefore we can directly apply all the results
of panel  data  models.  As  a  result,  we  can  use  the  different  estimators  proposed  in  the
econometric  literature  of panel data,  the fixed  effects  model  or the random  effects  models.
The  choice  between  these  two  models,  as  is  well  known,  will  depend  on  the  possible
correlation  between  the  individual  effects  and  the  observable  explanatory  variables,  in this
case, the inputs (xk).
If this correlation  exists, the parameters of the model Equation 5 can be estimated with
the within groups (WG) estimators. The individual effects can be defined as
as = a  - ui =  a  - ui and their estimation will be obtained from the within estimators of the
^ WG
parameters of the model  (Bk
From this  estimation  of the N independent  terms  al,a2,...aN  an  estimation of the
independent  term  and  the  level  of  (in)  efficiency  (ui)  can  be  obtained  from  a  simple
procedure:
a  = max(ai)  (7)
ui = a-a,  (8)
ET7  = e-U'  (8)
9This  transformation  is  necessary  in  order  to  obtain  positive  values  for  all  the  ui.  It  is  a
translation  of the  frontier  suggested  by  Greene  (1980).  With  this  operation  the  technical
3 efficiency index of the most efficient firm will be equal to one3.
The second  way to  estimate  Equation  5 proposed  in the  panel  data  literature  is the
random  effects  models  Generalized  Least Squares  (GLS)  estimator.  These  models  must be
used when unobservable individual effects are not correlated with the regressors because they
are  more efficient than  the within estimators.  Thus, the problem  of this estimator lies in the
necessity  to  assume  that  the  individual  effects  (efficiency  level  of  the  firms)  and  the
explanatory  variables  (inputs)  are not correlated.  That is, in this case,  one does not admit the
possibility that  if the  firm  know  its  inefficiency  level  it will  be conditioned  to  choose  the
quantities of inputs in its productive process.
^ GIs
From this GLS  estimation of the parameters  1k  ,  one  can recover the individual
effects from the residuals, and with them one makes the same operation as in the fixed effects
models  to  recover  the technical  efficiency  index.  Note  that  this procedure  also gives  us an
estimation of o2U  .
4. EMPIRICAL  SPECIFICATION
We  specify  a Cobb-Douglas  production  frontier.  Output  is  measured  by the  yearly
water production,  and labor,  capital  and materiel  quantities  are the  main inputs considered.
Other  variables  of interest  are:  the  energy  cost  and  the  number  of connections.  Taking
logarithms from this Cobb-Douglas production function we have:
y,= a  +&ku + flmm+  flLhu + PECeCgi + I3PSPsj  + acucu, +  -t + R  (10)
g,,  = v,,a-u,,  (1 1)
where y, k, m and h represent,  respectively,  the logarithms of the real output, the real  capital
stock, the materials  in constant prices, the hours of work, the energy costs in constant  prices
and  the  number  of connections;  the  coefficients  py,  PM,  PL  ,  PEC  and  pNC  are  the  output
3  We can find a problem of inconsistency as theory tells us that cti estimations will be consistent if T  om.
10elasticities  of inputs, and the  sum of them gives us the elasticity of scale,  which indicates the
returns to scale.  There  is also the variable cu which is a measurement of capacity utilization;
the role of this measure is to introduce links with input flows, and t is a variable added here to
measure the Hicks-neutral technical  change, that is common  among firms  in the same sector.
The  composed  error  term  combines  sit,  which  is  assumed  to  be  normally  distributed  and
uncorrelated  with the ui and with the explanatory  variables, with ui, which captures  the level
of inefficiency of the water firm and so it will be greater or equal to zero.
The  main justifications  for the  selection  of this  specification  of a water production
function  for  Africa  are  the  following.  First,  in most  African  countries,  the production  cost
structure  is not know  or the  degree  of uncertainty  surrounding  cost structures  is relatively
high,  therefore  it  is  better  to  estimate  a  production  function  rather  than  a  cost  function.
Second,  in most classical papers, capital and length of network are two key variables; while in
the  present  case,  those  two  variables  are  highly  correlated  (multi-colinearity  issue).  That
means  that  one  of these  two  variables  should be  used  but not  both of them.  Third, in  the
specific  context of African  countries, the number of connections is a very important variable
since the average size family is between 7 and 9 for some African countries and even more for
others (free rider issue).  Finally,  the variable t should capture technological  impact within the
water industry in Africa.
As for the mains  issues relating to the estimation procedure, they can be summarized
as  follows.  Since  we have  an  unbalanced panel  of data  and water  firms  are of diverse  size
(small,  medium  and large),  it is unlikely that the  model would pass a test of homoskedastic
variances.  Even  logarithmic  specifications  postulating  percentage  variation  across  cross-
sectional units  are  likely to  be heteroskedastic,  because  observations  for lower  output firms
are likely to evoke  larger variances  [e.g.,  see  Kumbhakar  and Bhattacharyya,  1996; Baltagi
and Griffin,  1988].  Moreover,  the estimation of a seemingly unrelated  regression model with
an unbalanced panel of data set gives rise to some estimation problems [e.g., see Baltagi, 1995
and Schmidt,  1977]. For different time periods, there are different number of units (i.e., firms
drop out without replacement)  which change the ordering of observations.  Since it dictates the
structure of the variance-covariance  matrix [e.g., see Baltagi,  1985], the ordering is important.
Furthermore, as N -+ Xo  we can consistently separate the intercept a from the one-sided individual effects.Therefore,  the process of estimation proposed is the following:  First, we estimate the
model  Equation  (10) with the  Within Group  (WG)  estimator.  This  estimator  is consistent
when the individual effects  (inefficiency)  are correlated with the  other variables  in the model
(productive  factors) or when this correlation  does not exist.  Second, one obtains Generalized
Least Squares (GLS) estimators.  This estimator is more efficient than the WG, when none of
the  variables  are  correlated  with  the  individual  effects.  If  this  correlation  exists,  WG
estimation  is  required.  To  determine  the  most  suitable  model,  a  Hausman  test  to  decide
whether to use one estimator or the other is provided.
Another problem presented  in the estimation of a production  function  is the possible
endogeneity of the explanatory  variables.  In general,  one can expect that labor input may be
simultaneously  determined  with  output.  In  order  to  take  this  problem  into  account,  the
instrumental variable  (IV) estimation of model Equation  10 is also presented.  The instruments
used in these estimations are based on energy costs (contemporaneous  or one-period lagged).
To check the endogeneity of labor a Hausman simultaneity test is also provided.
Additional  problems  exist with this last estimation procedure:  for example,  there is a
question  as to  whether one  should use differences  or levels  as instruments.  Arellano  (1989)
gives evidence that the latter is preferable.  More recently, Ahn and Schmidt  (1993) observed
that the IV estimator neglects quite a lot of information  and is therefore  inefficient.  They thus
proposed a more general estimator based on GMM.
5. RESULTS
The results  summarized  here provide  an  answer to each  one  of the  policy  concerns
identified earlier.  In addition, they allow to point to more structural  issues in the sector thanks
to an analysis of the shifts of the frontier during the period of analysis.
5.1 A synthetic indicator of  Africa's water utilities
Table  2  displays  the  estimated  coefficients  and  statistical  significance  tests.  In
addition,  we  also  present  the  Hausman  test  result  to  discriminate  among  methods  of
estimation, based on econometric  contrasts. We start by estimating Equation (10) based on the
WG estimator.  Then  we apply the statistical  tests on the  residuals:  tests for autocorrelation,
tests for heteroskedasticity,  tests for multicollinearity,  tests for normality etc.  The diagnostics
12clearly indicate, as expected, a serious problem of heteroskedasticity.  Second,  as suggested by
Greene  (1980),  we apply  a transformation  to  the  original  data  and re-estimate  the model  in
order  to get  the  GLS  estimates.  The  results  are  very satisfactory.  Out  of six  explanatory
variables,  four are  significant.  Capital  input  is not significant  across  all  the estimations  and
has  an  unexpected  sign.  The  explanation  may  be  that  the  selected  functional  form  is  not
adequate;  and/or  that  there  is  a  great  heterogeneity  among  firms  within  the African  water
industry. It may also reflect to trend to focus more on small scale operations  discussed earlier.
Results confirm the non-endogeneity of labor as seen from the Hausman  simultaneity
test.  The  estimation  with the GMM  has  given similar  results. Note  also that the GLS  is the
favorite  due to the absence  of correlation between  the individual  effects and the explanatory
variables confirmed by the Hausman test.
Table 2:  Estimation Results and Diagnostic Tests
Dependent variable: Total water production
Regressor  Specification (standard deviation *
WG  GLS  GMM  IV
Constant  1.7128  (0.133)  0.001a  (0.125)  1.7358  (0.145)  1.775a  (0.135)
Capital  0.0017  0.00016  0.00015  0.00015
(0.00037)  (0.00034)  (0.00033)  (0.00034)
Materials  0.00092a  0.00013a  0.00014a  0.00015a
(0.00031)  (0.00030)  (0.0004)  (0.0005)
Labor  0.0016a  0.0017a  0.0016a  0.0018a
(0.00046)  (0.00044)  (0.00045)  (0.00047)
Energy Costs  -0.00006  -0.00007  -0.00006  -0.0008
(0.00018)  (0.00017)  (0.00019)  (0.0002)
Technology  -0.00037  -0.00037  -0.00037  -0.00039
(0.00039)  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)
Diagnostics:
Degree of Freedom  31  31  31  31
_~  2  0.38  0.39  0.27  0.28
S.e.e  2.30%  2.11%  2.40%  2.43%
Error  auto-  1.81  1.86  1.83  1.79
correlation***
Durbin 'h'
LM (1)  F 6,31 = 0.63  0.54  0.72  0.81
ARCH (1)**  F(1,68 = 0.05  0.02  0.04  0.05
Normality  Z(2) = 0.76  0.75  0.77  0.78
Reset (1)  F(153) = 0.22  0.18  0.25  0.27
Hausman Test
x2(5)  6.86  1.21  2.23  NO
Notes:* 't' statistics are derived using heteroscedastic  -consistent estimates of standard-errors.
**  the errors  auto-correlation  tests and the ARCH tests are all adjusted for gaps.
13For the sample analyzed and the period covered,  the average performance  is only 54% which
is not great  and the standard  deviation  is .19. The top performers  score  high at  85 and 83%  which is
close to three times the score of the bottom performers who score between 30 and 35%.
5.2 Is Small Costly?
Table  3 reports  the  elasticity of scale  and the  rate  of technical  progress  within the
water sector.  These two variables  are important to the extent that they provide  some insights
on  the  trade-offs  between  a  CDD  approach  to  water  management  and  a  utilities  based
approach.  The scale indicator suggests that constant return to scale prevails  in the WSSUs in
African  water  industry.  This  implies  that  there  is  no  major  reason  to  worry  for  the  costs
consequences  of the leakage of clients from utilities towards  smaller scale operations.
The  second  indicator  is  the  rate  of technical  progress  reveal.  It  turns  out  that  the
impact  of technology  is  very  limited  in the  context  of WSSUs  in  African  water  industry
during the period under  analysis.  Suggesting once more that the cost of the diversification of
water  supply providers  is  not costly  at  least in  terms of not benefiting  from  technological
improvement  often  expected  from  large  utilities.  This  latter  result  should  be  taken  with
caution due to the sample size.
Table 3: RELEVANT PARAMETERS
Country  Water  Elasticity of  Scale  Rate Technical Progress (%)
Utility
WG  GLS  GMN  IV  WG  GLS  GMN  IV
Benin  SBEE  0.55  0.51  0.55  0.48  0.3b  O.lb  0.4b  0.3b
Burkina Faso  ONEA  0.43  0.44  0.47  0.40  0 .5b  0.4b  0.3b  0 . 8b
Cote d'Ivoire  SODECI  0.44  0.41  0.40  0.39  0.2b  0.3b  0.3b  0.9b
Ethiopia  AA WSA  0.33  0.30  0.30  0.31  0.4b  o.gb  o.8b  0.7b
Ghana  GWSC  0.68  0.70  0.70  0.71  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.9
Mauritius  CWA  0.53  0.51  0.51  0.52  0.3b  0.4b  0.4b  0.3b
Morocco  ONEP  0.93a  0.98a  0.99a  0.98a  2.1  2.0  1.8  1.8
Morocco  RED  0Q94a  0.91a  0.92a  0.96a  1.8  2.0  1.9  1.9
Namibia  WM  0.55  0.48  0.46  0.44  0.4b  0.3b  0.2b  0.3b
Niger  SNE  0.34  0.33  0.31  0.35  0 .5b  0.7'  0.7b  0.7b
14Nigeria  KdSWB  0.61  0.60  0.64  0.71  0.6b  0.7b  0.9b  o.gb
Nigeria  KtSVTB  0.47  0.44  0.45  0.48  0.4b  0.4b  0.4b  0 . 5b
Nigeria  BOSWB  0.48  0.47  0.48  0.41  0.5b  0.5b  0.8b  0.8b
Nigeria  EdSWB  0.39  0.39  0.33  0.35  0.8b  0.9b  0.gb  o.9b
Senegal  SDE  0.41  0.40  0.41  0.41  0.70b  06b  o.5b  0.4b
South Africa  TMGENI  0.97a  0.98g  1.04a  1.088  3.1  3.0  3.1  3.3
South Africa  RAND-W  0.96a  097T  1.038  1.09a  2.4  2.3  2.3  2.5
Togo  RNET  0.31  0.30  0.30  0.33  1.1  1.1  1.5  1.5
Tunisia  SONEDE  0.88a  0.868  0.86a  1.Ola  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.9
Uganda  NWSC  0.76  0.77  0.78  0.79  1.2  1.2  1.0  1.3
Zambia  LMSC  1.01a  1.05  a  1.058  1.068  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.2
5.3  Do Institutional factors such a ownership and governance  matter?
Recent  studies  have  shown  that  institutional  factors  at  the  discretion  of  the
management  as  well  as  environmental  factors beyond  the control of managers  or regulators
affect  water  efficiency  (e.g,  see  Ferrier  and Valdmanis  1996,  Valdamnis  1992,  Ozcan  and
Luke  1993,  Rosko  et  al.  1995).  Some  of the  factors  that  influence  the  efficiency  of water
utilities  cited  in the  literature  are:  corruption  (various  indices),  governance  (various  indices)
etc. This can be tested from the results obtained here.
The efficiency scores of water utilities are  examined using  a censored tobit model to
identify  factors  influencing  inefficiency.  The environmental  variables  are excluded  as their
numbers are not sufficiently large to undertake a multivariate analysis.
In the tobit model, for computational  convenience  it is preferred to assume a censoring
point at zero (e.g, see Greene,  1993).
Formally, the tobit model is defined as follows:
Y=  ii+  (i
Y = Y;  f  Y' > 0  (12)
Y=  =Oif y; <O
where  ij - N(O,  a2), and
yj is the observed inefficiency score;
15I is a k x 1 vector of unknown parameters;
xi is a k x 1 vector of explanatory variables.
The empirical model, therefore, takes the following form:
INEFF  =  0+/3,CORRflDEX +/ 2GOVERIVDEX +/3 3DUM + 5 (13)
where:
INEFF is the inefficiency score;
CORRINDEX  is the corruption index;
GOVERNINDEX  is the govemance  index;
DUM is a dummy variable: = 1 if the water utility is private; = 0 otherwise.
Statistical analyses  are performed using STATA 5 statistical software (Statacorp  1997).
Results are displayed in Table 7. An important feature of the results is that institutional
variables  are statistically significant at the five percent level; their signs are also as expected.
An  interpretation  of these results  corroborate the  fact that corruption  is negatively  linked to
efficiency  while  govemance  is positively  linked.  As  a consequence,  water  utilities  should
also focus on institutional variables when trying to improve their efficiency scores.
Table 5: Inefficiency  and Institutional Variables
Independent variable  Coefficient  Standard deviation
Constant  1.989**  0.508
Corruption  0.0344***  0.048
Governance  0.041**  0.0247
Dummy (Privately operated=1)  -0.028**  0.015
LR tes  35.28***
Mc Fadden's R2 0.348
Notes:  Numbers in  parentheses  are  standard errors.  Single, double,  and triple asteriks (*)  denote  significance  at the
10%, 5%  and 1%, respectively.
A final interesting result is the effect of ownership on the efficiency of the firm.. In the
present context, the dummy variable  which captures the effect of privatization  is statistically
significant  at  the  five  percent  level.  In  terms  of policy  implications,  this  suggests  that
privatization  has had an impact on water utilities in the African  context. This is in contrast to
the results found by Estache  and Rossi  (2001)  for Asia where no  significant  difference  was
found.
166. Conclusions
The results of this study provide preliminary empirical evidence on the performance  of
water utilities in many African countries.  The findings suggest that many of the water utilities
operate technical efficiency levels well below a best-practice frontier that is determined by the
relatively efficient ones from the group.  Only about  12.9 per cent of the water utilities operate
efficiently  as  compared  to their peers.4 This  finding  supports the commonly held view  that
Africa's water sector operate  at unacceptable  levels of technical  inefficiency but may surprise
some by the extent of the problem.
The  policy  implications  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  The  improvement  in  the
efficiency of the  sector should go a long way in financing  the need to improve access and/or
quality of water production  and distribution.  Continuing the public or private financing of the
sector without significant efficiency improvement is  a major waste of scarce resources in the
region.  Efficiency  savings  exceeds revenue  from user fees which  implies that  average tariff
levels  continue  to  be  too  high  as  compared  to  what  they would  be if firms  were  operated
efficiently.  The  poverty  alleviations  implications  are  obvious.  Water  should  become  more
accessible  and more  affordable  with major improvements  in the operation  of the sector  and
private operators  have so far been able to work in that direction,  even if they did not operate
the best performing companies during the period under study.
The main challenges  are however not in the water sector.  Governance  issues and  the
weakness  of institutions have  been and continue to contribute to explain  a  large share  in the
excess  of costs. These problems  are just as important as the ownership debate and need to be
addressed  as well.
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